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The lifecycle employment profiles of minority labor migrants who came to Norway in 
the  early  1970s  diverge  significantly  from  those  of  native  comparison  persons. 
During the early years, employment in the migrant group was nearly complete and 
exceeded that of natives. But, about ten years upon arrival, immigrant employment 
started  a  sharp  and  steady  decline,  and  by  2000  their  employment  rate  was  50 
percent,  compared  to  87  percent  for  the  native  comparison  group.  We  find  that 
immigrant employment is particularly sensitive to the business cycle, and that the 
economic downturns of the 1980s and 1990s accelerated their exit from the labor 
market. We trace part of the decline to the migrants initially being overrepresented 
in  shrinking  industries  and  occupations.  But  we  also  identify  considerable 
disincentives embedded in the social security system that contribute to poor lifecycle 
employment performance of immigrants with many dependent family members. 
 



















Bernt Bratsberg, Oddbjørn Raaum, and Knut Røed* 
 
 
The Ragnar Frisch Centre for Economic Research 
Gaustadalleen 21 


















*We are grateful to George Borjas, Martin Browning, Ivan Harsløf, Morten Johansen, Atle Seierstad, Gunvor 
Strømsheim, and Sverre Try for valuable comments and to Elisabeth Fevang for excellent research assistance. Data 
supplied by Statistics Norway have been crucial for the completion of this research. We also gratefully acknowledge 
financial support from the Ministry of Labour and Social Inclusion and the Ministry of Finance (Frisch project 
#1391) and the World Bank Research Program on International Migration and Development. The paper is part of the 







The lifecycle employment profiles of minority labor migrants who came to Norway in the early 
1970s diverge significantly from those of native comparison persons. During the early years, 
employment in the migrant group was nearly complete and exceeded that of natives. But, about 
ten years upon arrival, immigrant employment started a sharp and steady decline, and by 2000 
their employment rate was 50 percent, compared to 87 percent for the native comparison group. 
We find that immigrant employment is particularly sensitive to the business cycle, and that the 
economic downturns of the 1980s and 1990s accelerated their exit from the labor market. We 
trace part of the decline to the migrants initially being overrepresented in shrinking industries and 
occupations. But we also identify considerable disincentives embedded in the social security 
system that contribute to poor lifecycle employment performance of immigrants with many 
dependent family members.  
  1   
I. Introduction  
With the aging of their native population, many developed nations are approaching a 
‘demographic deficit’ with soaring dependency ratios. Most of these nations have, at some point 
over the past decades, adopted legislation that restricts immigration flows from developing 
countries. Given the large pool of potential foreign labor, a possible policy response to the 
problem of an aging population is to ease immigration restrictions and admit more labor migrants 
from less developed countries. This issue is high on the political agenda in many rich countries.
1 
As shown by Storesletten (2000; 2003), immigration has the promise of mitigating the fiscal 
burden associated with aging populations both in the United States and in Europe, but these 
prospects hinge crucially on how immigrants fare in the labor market and, in particular, on their 
expected labor market participation rates. By requiring labor migrants to be employed upon 
arrival, close to full participation is ensured initially. However, the impact of immigration on 
overall fiscal conditions also depends on the long-term employment patterns of labor immigrants 
as well as their families.  
Studies from Europe, North America, and Australia find that immigrants assimilate into 
the host country’s labor market, and that, e.g., earnings gaps between immigrants and natives 
narrow with the number of years since migration (Chiswick, 1978; Borjas, 1999; Bauer et al., 
2000).
2 There are important differences across host countries, however, with respect to the 
selection of immigrants, the presence of xenophobia and discriminatory practices, and work  
                                                 
1 For example, the Commission of the European Communities (2005, p. 4) states that “… while immigration in itself 
is not a solution to demographic ageing, more sustained immigration flows could increasingly be required to meet the 
needs of the EU labour market and ensure Europe's prosperity.” 
2 Recent studies of immigrant earnings assimilation in the Scandinavian countries include Edin et al. (2000) for 
Sweden, Husted et al. (2000) for Denmark, and Barth et al. (2004) for Norway. The evidence from these studies 
indicates significant assimilation effects among immigrants in general, but also that the assimilation process varies 
importantly according to arrival cohort, country of origin, and class of admission.  2   
incentives facing immigrants. Hence, empirical findings regarding the assimilation process of 
immigrants may not be directly transferable across different countries. In welfare state 
economies, one could speculate that a more open-border immigration policy may result in a mix 
of immigrants that adds to the fiscal challenges rather than alleviating them. Countries with an 
egalitarian wage structure might be considered a more attractive destination for low-skilled than 
for high-skilled immigrants (Borjas, 1987). And countries with generous and costly social 
security systems might be more attractive for individuals who foresee a high probability of 
becoming dependent on the social security system than for individuals who expect to have to pay 
for it. Hence, the structural characteristics of European labor markets and social security systems 
entail the risk of attracting immigrants with weak employment prospects.  
As legal restrictions have limited immigration flows from less advanced countries to 
European welfare states, there has been little scope for empirical evaluation of assimilation 
processes of labor migrants from developing nations. Over recent decades, immigrants from 
developing countries have typically entered as part of a family reunification process or seeking 
political asylum, with very few admitted on the basis of employment. Empirical evidence 
indicates that these immigrant groups have substantially higher inactivity rates than natives in 
European host countries (see, e.g., OECD, 2001). Differences between immigrants and natives in 
employment are likely to be mirrored in their welfare dependency rates. In an otherwise scant 
literature, Hansen and Lofstrom (2003) and Riphahn (2004) show that immigrant groups 
originating in poor countries are more likely to collect social assistance than other immigrants 
and natives in Sweden and Germany, respectively. It remains unclear, however, whether such 
nativity and country-of-origin differences in employment status and welfare use merely relate to 
the fact that many immigrants from developing countries came for reasons of political 
persecution or family reunification, and not primarily for the purpose of seeking work, or whether  3   
the patterns represent structural deficiencies in the host countries’ ability to integrate minority 
immigrants into their labor markets.  
In the present paper, we follow the wave of labor migrants that arrived in Norway from 
developing countries during the period 1971 to 1975, just before Norway imposed a freeze on 
labor immigration from outside the Nordic countries. Based on access to administrative registers, 
we track their employment history over the 30 year period from the date of entry until year 2000. 
For the last third of the observation period, we can also study participation in public welfare 
programs. The labor market outcomes and assimilation process of this group of migrant workers 
are of particular relevance for public policy. If the underlying migration motive is important for 
labor market performance in the host country, the long-run experience of this wave of labor 
migrants may convey valuable information about the expected labor market behavior of would-be 
immigrants were borders to be reopened.  
Our main findings are rather dismaying. Focusing on male immigrants from the four 
largest nonwestern countries of origin during the relevant period (Pakistan, Turkey, India,  and 
Morocco), we find that labor market participation was very high during the first ten years upon 
arrival, with employment rates consistently above 96 percent and exceeding those of a native 
comparison group (matched on age and education). After ten years, however, employment among 
the labor migrants declined sharply. And by year 2000, only 50 percent of the labor migrants 
were still in employment, compared to 87 percent of the native comparison group. The great 
majority of the labor migrants under study were later joined by a spouse from the source country. 
The long-term labor market outcomes of the spouses are even less favorable than those of their 
husbands. For example, the spouse employment rate never exceeded 40 percent, and by 2000, it 
had declined to 30 percent, compared to 80 percent for the spouses of the native control group. 
After they left the labor market, most of the labor migrants claimed various types of social  4   
security benefits. In 2000, we find that 74 percent of the non-employed labor migrants (and 28 
percent of their non-employed spouses) received a permanent disability pension and that more 
than 90 percent received some form of social security transfer. 
The paper examines the dynamic process by which immigrants and natives become non-
employed, in terms of incidence and persistence. We find that around three quarters of the 
immigrant-native employment differential can be attributed to differences in non-employment 
incidence. Having left employment, the prospects for re-entry deteriorate more rapidly for 
immigrants than for natives, and immigrants require longer tenure in a new employment spell to 
attain job security. We also find that immigrant movements out of and back into employment are 
particularly sensitive to business cycle fluctuations. This sensitivity, combined with their stronger 
duration effects, led to lasting negative effects of the economic downturns of the 1980s and 1990s 
on immigrant employment.  
The paper discusses alternative explanations behind the weak long-term employment 
performance of the labor migrant group. We end up focusing on two key mechanisms. First, we 
show that the migrants disproportionately held jobs in industries and occupations where even 
natives experienced relatively short employment careers. Second, we argue that the Norwegian 
welfare system—with high replacement ratios for household heads with low labor earnings, a 
non-working spouse, and many children—provides weak work incentives for families of the type 
that dominates the cohort of labor migrants considered in this paper. These conclusions are based 
on analyses where we, for those employed in 1980, examine employment status in year 2000 
conditional on a wide range of characteristics describing the jobs they held twenty years earlier 
(such as occupation, industry, pay, and location) and a vector of family characteristics that 
influence the social security replacement ratio (the number of children and the presence of a non-
working spouse). An intriguing finding is that the two factors, job characteristics and family  5   
structure, explain equally sizeable shares of the immigrant-native employment differential in 
2000—conditioning on each of the sets of variables reduces the differential by close to one third.  
The next section provides a description of our data and gives a brief empirical overview of 
employment patterns and social security take-up rates. Section III presents a longitudinal analysis 
of labor market transitions for immigrants and natives, aimed at decomposing the employment 
differential into non-employment incidence and persistence, and to examine the impacts of key 
determinants like age, years since migration, and local labor market tightness. Section IV 
discusses the underlying economic mechanisms, and Section V concludes. 
 
II. Data and Empirical Overview 
The empirical analyses are based on data samples assembled from administrative registers 
covering the complete immigrant and native populations of Norway in year 2000. Immigrant 
status is defined by country of birth and year of arrival. Foreign-born individuals with 
Norwegian-born parents and Norwegian-born with immigrant parents are excluded from the 
samples. Our aim is to study lifecycle employment of adult, work-oriented immigrants from 
developing countries. This motivates our extract of immigrant men born between 1936 and 1955 
who entered Norway between 1971 and 1975 from one of the following four countries: Pakistan, 
Turkey, India, and Morocco. (These four countries account for 81.2 percent of the non-European 
male immigrants in the relevant birth and entry cohorts.) For that cohort, admission to Norway 
required prior issuance of a work permit which in practice meant that the migrant held a job offer 
at the time of entry. Around 1970 Norwegian manufacturing experienced shortages in domestic 
labor markets and actively recruited workers from developing countries. The immigrant wave 
was further spurred by restrictions on labor immigration imposed elsewhere in Europe and, in  6   
particular, by the strict policies implemented in Denmark in November 1970 (Castles, 2006; 
Tjelmeland and Brochmann, 2003). Relatively few labor migrants from developing countries 
arrived before 1971 (Bratsberg et al., 2007), and, in 1975, Norway invoked a temporary 
moratorium on immigration from outside the Nordic region. Following the 1975 moratorium, 
new legislation favored admission based on family reunification and political asylum rather than 
work. As we also describe below, the vast majority of the cohort members were later joined by a 
spouse and close relatives who entered as part a family reunification process. As such, the 
migrant cohort under study set the stage for substantial subsequent immigration flows to Norway. 
To illustrate, the Pakistani-born members of our sample, fewer than 1,700 in number, form the 
origin of the largest foreign national group in Norway at the turn of the century. (As of January 1, 
2001, there were 24,000 persons of Pakistani descent residing in Norway.) Unlike for the large 
immigrant groups that were admitted to Norway during the 1980s and 1990s, the labor migrants 
of the 1970s were not offered any formal instruction in Norwegian language or society.
3 
A.  Employment patterns among immigrants and natives 
Our employment data draw on individual histories of accumulation of credit points in the 
Norwegian public pension system. Earned pension credit points in a given year are tied to the 
individual’s earnings that year. In principle, all labor-related earnings constitute the basis for 
calculation of credits, including wage and salary incomes, self-employment earnings, 
                                                 
3 As employment was not typically the prime migration motive for female nonwestern immigrants who arrived in the 
early 1970s, we focus on men. Using the same sampling criteria as for the male sample, we find that the 1976 
employment rate of female immigrants was less than 30 percent, compared to 97 percent for males, which 
strengthens the case for gender differences in migration motive. Moreover, 67 percent of the female group was in 
fact married to a member of the male migrant cohort under study (in 2000). The employment experiences of the 
spouses of the male cohort are discussed towards the end of the paper.  7   
unemployment benefits, long-term sick leave benefits, and maternity leave allowances.
4 
Specifically, credit points are computed from total annual earnings and the social security base 
figure (G, which equals NOK 70,246, or about $11,700, in 2008). Individuals receive no credits 
unless their earnings are at least 1 G and we define an individual as being employed during the 
year if he earned at least some credits that year.   
To make the native-born reference group comparable to the migrant cohort, we stratify the 
native sample so as to match the distributions of birth year and education in the migrant sample. 
Table 1 lists means of key variables in the two samples. About 65 percent were born between 
1946 and 1955 (i.e., they are less than 54 years of age in 2000). Pakistani natives make up two 
thirds of the cohort, followed by immigrants from Turkey and India (around 15 percent each), and 
finally immigrants from Morocco with 6.5 percent. Close to one half of the immigrants arrived in 
1971 or 1972. Not reported, the median age at arrival was 25, with two thirds of the cohort 
arriving between the ages of 20 and 28. Very few of the immigrants are unmarried and 94 percent 
of the married immigrant males have an immigrant spouse, compared to three percent among 
natives. The median year of arrival for the immigrant wife was six years after her husband.  
The educational attainment of the migrant cohort compares favorably with attainment in 
the source populations, but unfavorably with education levels in Norway.
5 For example, 
according to the Pakistan Federal Bureau of Statistics (2004), 21 percent of Pakistani men born 
between 1949 and 1953, and 23 percent of those in the Punjab region (the source region for the 
                                                 
4 Because unemployment insurance (UI) benefits enter the base for calculation of pension credits, we risk 
misclassifying some unemployed individuals as being employed. But since UI eligibility requires recent employment 
(normally the last calendar year), this potential measurement error is limited to the exact timing of long non-
employment spells, not their occurrence.   
5 Unfortunately, information on attainment is missing for 15 percent of the immigrant sample. Educational attainment 
among the foreign-born is collected from the 1980 census of population, registers of Norwegian educational 
institutions, or from two surveys intended to complete the central education register and administered by Statistics 
Norway to all resident immigrants with missing schooling data in 1989 and 1999.   8   
Table 1: Descriptive statistics 
    Immigrants from Pakistan, 
Turkey, India and Morocco, 
arrived 1971-75 
 
Matched group of Norwegian 
born 
Birth cohorts    
 1936-40  0.123  0.113 
 1941-45  0.227  0.222 
 1946-50  0.390  0.404 
 1951-55  0.260  0.261 
Country of birth    
 Pakistan  0.646   
 Turkey  0.155   
 India  0.134   
 Morocco  0.065   
Year of arrival in Norway     
 1971  0.354   
 1972  0.119   
 1973  0.131   
 1974  0.220   
 1975  0.176   
Educational attainment     
  Not available   0.146  0.004 
  Less than 10 years  0.309  0.345 
 10-11  years  0.227  0.275 
 12  years  0.109  0.126 
 13-15  years  0.079  0.094 
 16+  years  0.130  0.156 
Marital status    
 Married    0.955  0.880 
  Immigrant spouse (among married)   0.938  0.032 
Observations   2,553  28,720 
Note: The native reference group is matched on the basis of birth year and educational attainment. The higher 
proportions in various education brackets for natives reflect a lower fraction with missing values recorded in the 
education register.   
 
majority of our sample), have completed high school (‘matric’). Even if we assume that those 
with missing education data only have compulsory schooling or less, the high-school completion 
rate for Pakistanis of that age group in our sample is 37 percent. In comparison, the completion 
rate among Norwegian-born men of those birth cohorts is 51 percent. (Conditional on non-
missing data, the high-school completion rate in the migrant and the stratified native sample is 38 
percent, as Table 1 shows.)  
In Figure 1, we plot the employment shares of the labor migrant and native reference 
samples by calendar year over the 1975-2000 period. More than 96 percent of the labor migrant 
group was employed each year during the late 1970s and early 1980s, and in this period their   9   

































employment rate was even higher than that of natives. Around 1982, the employment share in the 
immigrant group started a steady decline and fell to 50 percent by year 2000. The employment 
rate in the native reference group also started a slow decline at about the same time, but the slope  
was much smaller with about 87 percent of the native group employed by the end of the sample 
period.
6   
B.  Where have all the (previously) employed immigrants gone?  
Underlying our data set, various administrative registers provide information on public transfers 
and welfare program participation. To examine the economic status of immigrants who are not  
                                                 
6 We also examined employment of male immigrants from the neighboring Scandinavian countries who entered 
during the same period and who remained in Norway until 2000. The employment profile of this group is remarkably 
similar to that of natives; to illustrate, their 2000 employment rate was 88 percent. Complicating a study of long-term 
employment among migrants from the neighboring countries is their very high propensity to outmigrate. Data from 
the migration register show that, by 2000, fully 72 percent of the original Scandinavian cohort had permanently left 
Norway (compared to only 23 percent of the cohort under study; see the discussion in section II C).  10   
Table 2: Year 2000 rates of unemployment incidence, sick leave, rehabilitation, social assistance, 
and disability pension; males aged 45 to 64 
 
  Immigrants from Pakistan, Turkey, India 
and Morocco, arrived 1971-75 
 













        
Unemployment   .124  .112 .136 .080 .079 .080 
Long-term sick leave  .176 .007 .344 .160 .010 .183 
Rehabilitation .083  .097 .068 .036 .086 .028 
Social assistance   .115 .181 .049 .028 .121 .014 
Disability pension  .444  .737 .152 .156 .703 .072 
        
At least one transfer   .734 .901 .567 .370 .823 .301 
        
Early retirement   .003 .005 .002 .010 .027 .008 
Children   .943  .936 .951 .849 .725 .868 
Married   .955  .938  .972 .880 .751 .899 
In data or married   .991  .982 1 .996  .971 1 
        
Observations 2,553  1,275  1,278 28,720 3,785 24,935 
Percent of sample  100.0 49.9  50.1 100.0 13.2  86.8 
        
Note: Unemployment (incidence): appearance at least once in the end-of-month registers of the Public Employment 
Service (which includes active labor market program participants). Long-term sick leave: receipt of state sick leave 
benefits for medical leaves exceeding sixteen working days; only those with a job are eligible for this transfer. 
Rehabilitation: recipient of cash transfer related to vocational or medical rehabilitation. Social assistance: recipient of 
means-tested support in form of a cash transfer or, less commonly, a loan. Disability pension: receipt of a permanent 
disability pension, unconditional on degree of disability. Entitlement is subject to a medical test, but studies show that 
the program served as an exit route to early retirement during the recession of the early 1990s (Dahl et al., 2000).   
 
employed, we next describe patterns of registered unemployment, disability pensions, and 
transfers such as social assistance in 2000 (see Table 2). The immigrant cohort is more likely to 
experience unemployment or receive a welfare transfer than the native reference group. Fully 73 
percent of the immigrants are transfer recipients or registered unemployed during the year, 
compared to 37 percent of the native males. Forty-four percent of the immigrants receive a 
permanent disability pension, compared to 16 percent among natives. This major difference 
between the two groups largely reflects variation in employment status, although immigrants are 
more likely to receive transfers even conditional on employment status. As a further check of the 
residency status of the non-employed, we also looked for a child or a spouse in the population 
register. As the table shows, this condition holds for a large majority (94 percent) of the non-
employed immigrants.   11   















































The data underlying the descriptive statistics in Table 2 are available from 1992 onwards. 
In Figure 2, we display the trends in registered unemployment and participation in the various 
transfer programs over the 1992-2000 period. Unemployment and welfare program participation 
rates were consistently higher for immigrants compared to natives throughout the period, but the   
figure illustrates a compositional change taking place over the decade. High unemployment and 
extensive participation in sickness and rehabilitation programs stand out from panels A and B 
when we look at the immigrants’ experiences during the first half of 1990s. Social assistance was 
also common as more than one in five immigrants received this benefit. Over time, disability 
pension has gradually replaced other social security transfers. Presumably, many immigrants with 
long unemployment spells and rehabilitation needs failed to get back into employment and were 
entitled to a permanent disability pension. Disability pension uptake seems to follow non- 12   
employment with a time lag. In 1992, about one third of the non-employed immigrants in the 
sample received a disability pension. By 2000, this proportion had grown close to three out of 
four. As is evident from panel D, the decline in immigrant employment is mirrored by a sharply 
rising trend in disability retirement. 
Social assistance rates among immigrants drop towards the end of the decade (see panel 
C). In the literature, longitudinal patterns of receipt of social assistance have formed the basis for 
assessments of whether immigrants ‘assimilate into or out of welfare’ (Hansen and Lofstrom, 
2003; Riphahn, 2004). For the immigrant cohort under study, sole focus on social assistance 
would have led us to erroneously conclude that welfare dependency fell over time. In truth, 
welfare participation in the immigrant group increased substantially over the period, with the 
economically more favorable disability retirement replacing reliance on social assistance. The 
finding underscores the importance of considering the multitude of programs that make up the 
welfare state when assessing immigrant-native differences in welfare participation. 
C.  Return migration  
The fact that we are able to locate more than 98 percent of the immigrants who are not employed 
in 2000 in the unemployment register or as recipients of a welfare transfer, or identify a spouse or 
child in the Norwegian population register, debunks the more mundane explanation that the 
observed pattern of declining employment is simply an artifact of unregistered outmigration 
taking place over time. But the question remains whether those who stayed in Norway for the 30 
year period are representative of the original immigrant cohort. Of particular concern is that the 
narrow income distribution and the extensive social insurance programs of Norway compared to  13   
the source countries might provide greater incentive for continued stay among the least skilled in 
the original migrant pool (Borjas and Bratsberg, 1996).
7  
Drawing on data from the central migration register, we identify 3,565 immigrants as 
belonging to the original cohort (based on gender, country and date of birth, and date of arrival).
8 
In Figure 3, we trace the fraction of the original cohort that remained in Norway over time. The 
plot shows a marked decline early on, indicating that most of the outmigration events took place 
very soon after arrival. By 1978, 14 percent of the cohort members had left the country. 
Thereafter, mortality and outmigration contributed to only a slow reduction in the fraction 
remaining and, in 2000, fully 72 percent of the original immigrant cohort remained alive and 
residing in Norway, with five percent registered deceased (i.e., they died while in Norway) and 
23 percent permanently out of the country.  
It is worth observing that payment of the main transfer benefit listed in Table 2, 
permanent disability, does not require residency in Norway. In fact, a number of the original 
cohort members who return migrated to their home country received their disability pension from 
Norwegian authorities there (Riaz, 2003).
9 Because we focus on those who remained in Norway 
in 2000, permanent outmigrants are not captured by our analyses. In the data, we are able to link 
moves abroad between 1993 and 2000 to employment and welfare transfer records. More than six 
percent of our sample (163 persons) had a temporary stay out of the country during this period, 
and an additional 124 persons from the original cohort left permanently during the late 1990s. 
                                                 
7 Data from the World Bank show that, around 1970, the ratio of income accruing to the top 10 percent to the bottom 
20 percent of the income distribution was 3.5 in Norway, compared to 5.3 in India, 5.4 in Pakistan, 9.5 in Morocco, 
and 12.0 in Turkey. 
8 The migration register data are described in detail in Bratsberg et al. (2007). Unfortunately, we can not link the 
records from the migration register to the pension credit data. 
9 In 2003, 257 persons in Turkey, 137 in Pakistan, and 120 in Morocco received benefits from the Norwegian 
pension system (Riaz, 2003). These counts do not all relate to the immigrant cohort under study, however.   14   
























































1970 1980 1990 2000
Year
Accounting for permanent return
Accounting for return and mortality
 
Note: Sample size is 3,564.  
 
The data reveal that outmigrants had worse employment outcomes than those who remained. For 
example, the 1990 employment rate was 43 percent among those who left permanently in the late 
1990s (compared to 72 percent in our sample), and, in 1992, 24 percent of the permanent 
outmigrants received a disability pension (vs. 15 percent of our sample). In 2000, 39 percent of 
the outmigrants received a disability pension while living abroad. That year, the employment rate 
among the temporary outmigrants was 40 percent, compared to 51 percent among stayers. The 
observed negative correlation between outmigration and employment, along with the direct and 
auxiliary evidence on disability pensions paid out in source countries, shows that permanent 
outmigration was not strictly dominated by positive selection. But, even in the extreme event 
where all of the outmigrants remained in Norway and were employed in 2000, the immigrant 
employment rate would be no higher than 62 percent. What is clear is that selective outmigration 
cannot be a major driver of the observed decline in immigrant employment.  15   
III. Empirical Analysis of Labor Market Transitions 
Why does the employment rate of labor migrants decline so rapidly compared to that of natives?  
In this section, we set up a statistical model aimed at investigating how the employment 
propensity depends on age, education, local labor market conditions, and, for immigrants, years 
since migration. A key feature of the model is that it makes it possible to disentangle the 
immigrant-native difference in non-employment propensities into differences in incidence, on the 
one hand, and persistence, on the other. The set-up also allows the degree of state duration 
dependence to differ between the two groups. The model specifies yearly transitions between the 
states of employment and non-employment within the framework of a discrete-time duration 
model.  
A. Methodology 
In the empirical model, transitions between the states of employment and non-employment are 
assumed to be governed by logistic probability functions. Let yjt=1 if individual j was employed 
in year t, and zero otherwise. Let l(.)  be a logistic probability function, i.e., 
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where the subscripts (, ) inare used to denote immigrant and native, respectively,  j I is a dummy 
variable for immigrant status, jt A is a set of dummy variables for age (21,22,…,64);   jt YSM  for  16   
years since migration (3,4,…,29);  jt R  for (seven) regions in Norway;  jt CY  for calendar year;  j E  
for educational attainment ( 9, ≤ 10-11, 12, 13-15,  16, ≥  missing);  jt D  for continuous duration in 
the present state (1,2,  3 ≥ years), and  jt u is the local unemployment rate relevant for individual j. 
All of these variables (except for immigrant status and educational attainment) are time varying. 
In addition, each individual is characterized by the unobserved time-invariant covariates 
12 (,) jj vv . 
Controlling properly for the presence of unobserved heterogeneity is crucial in this model, since 
unobserved sorting would otherwise bias the parameters attached to duration variables, such as 
state duration and years since migration. Without controlling for unobserved heterogeneity, it 
indeed turns out that we would grossly overstate any negative state duration dependence (for both 
immigrants and natives and for both states) and in addition introduce a major spurious source of 
favorable (i.e., negative) YSM effects on the immigrant exit rates from employment. The latter 
result reflects the fact that immigrants with the poorest employment prospects are the first to exit 
the labor market, leaving behind an increasingly positively selected group with fewer exits as 
time since migration increases.  
With two exceptions, our explanatory variables are allowed to affect employment 
transitions of the two groups differently. The exceptions are the calendar year () jt CY and region 
() jt R indicator variables, which we assume have the same impacts on (the log-odds ratios of) 
immigrants and natives. Because years since migration must equal the difference between current 
calendar year and the year of arrival, YSM is almost perfectly correlated with calendar year in the 
immigrant sample. The restriction that the calendar time effects are the same for the two groups 
permits identification of YSM effects, as calendar effects basically are identified from the native 
sample (Borjas, 1999). We nevertheless allow for differential responsiveness of immigrants and  17   
natives to economic fluctuations through the interaction of local unemployment and the 
immigrant variable (Bratsberg et al., 2006). 
At first glance, the model set-up appears to involve an initial conditions problem related to 
the distribution of initial states and durations. Note, though, that the population under study 
consists of labor migrants, who by definition were employed around the time of entry. For 
virtually all of them, this initial employment spell also lasted at least three years. Hence, we 
circumvent the initial conditions problem by defining a labor immigrant in this context as a 
person who came to Norway to work, and then remained employed for at least three years (we 
only lose 5 of the 2,553 immigrants as a result of this restriction, i.e., 0.2 percent of the sample). 
Similarly, we use the first occurrence of three consecutive years with employment as the event 
that triggers entry into the native comparison sample (we lose 145 of the 28,720 comparison 
persons as a result of this restriction, i.e., 0.5 percent of the sample). Given this sampling scheme, 
all of the individuals start out in the sample as employed, with the employment spell having 
lasted three years, and our model may be viewed as conditional on such an event having 
occurred.  
Let Yj be the set of outcomes observed for individual j during the observation window 
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where the two probability expressions are given in Equation (1). Since Equation (2) contains the 
two unobserved characteristics
12 (,) jj vv  it cannot be used directly in a data likelihood function. In 
order to eliminate the two unobserved covariates from the likelihood function, we take the 
expectation of individual likelihood contributions. To avoid arbitrary distributional assumptions,  18   
we rely on the non-parametric maximum likelihood estimator (NPMLE); see Lindsay (1983) and 
Heckman and Singer (1984). This implies that the joint distribution of unobserved 
heterogeneity
12 (,) jj vv  is modeled by means of a discrete distribution with an a priori unknown 
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where 
12 (,) qq vv is the location vector of support point q, and  q p is the associated probability. Our 
computational strategy follows the procedure outlined in Gaure et al. (2007).
10 We first maximize 
Equation (3) with respect to all the parameters of the model for Q=1 (no unobserved 
heterogeneity). We then add support points, one by one, and re-estimate the model as long as we 
are able to obtain an improvement in the likelihood function.
11 As a result of this process we end 
up with a model containing 8 support points in the heterogeneity distribution.
12 In total, the model 
contains 249 unknown parameters, 226 attached to observed characteristics and 23 describing the 
unobserved heterogeneity distribution. Gaure et al. (2007) show that standard statistical 
inference, based on the assumption of joint normality, can be made regarding parameters attached 
to observed characteristics, as if the number of support points in the heterogeneity distribution 
was known a priori. 
  Given our extensive use of dummy variables in the empirical model, it is difficult to 
interpret parameter estimates for each variable in isolation. Most of the results presented in this 
section therefore either take the form of simulated employment patterns based on the estimated 
                                                 
10 See also www.frisch.uio.no/NPMLE.html. 
11 We consider this criterion to be met when the likelihood increases by less than 0.001. 
12 We have also estimated the model separately for immigrants and natives. These estimations ended up requiring 8 
support points for natives and 5 points for immigrants. In the immigrant model, it was not possible to identify effects 
of calendar time and years since migration simultaneously. Otherwise the coefficient estimates were very similar to 
those reported in the paper. Complete results for the separate models are available upon request.   19   
model, or of transition probability profiles generated for ‘representative’ individuals. In order to 
provide statistical confidence intervals for the simulated patterns, we apply the parametric 
bootstrap; i.e., we make repeated draws from the (multivariate normal) distribution of parameter 
estimates and use them in the simulation exercises.
13 Each result presented in this section is based 
on 100 replications, and 90 percent confidence intervals are constructed by removing the five 
percent most extreme results at each end. Confidence intervals for the transition probability 
profiles are generated by conditioning on a (representative) transition probability for a reference 
characteristic, and we then use the computed standard errors to calculate confidence intervals. 
Only a few selected parameter estimates (marginal effects) are presented in this section. A 
complete list of parameter estimates, with standard errors, is provided in the Appendix. 
B.  Employment profiles of immigrants and natives 
In the upper panel of Figure 4, we first compare time profiles generated by repeated simulations 
based on the estimated model with the observed employment patterns of immigrants and natives. 
The profiles are drawn with respect to ‘years since sampling,’ i.e., years after each individual’s 
first (three-year) employment observation in the dataset, normalized such that year 1 is the final 
year of the pre-conditioned employment spell. For immigrants, this corresponds closely to years 
since migration minus two. For the native reference group, this time dimension has no particular 
interpretation beyond that it facilitates a direct comparison with the immigrant group. Figure 4 
illustrates that the model performs well in terms of replicating the observed employment 
histories.  
                                                 
13 In simulations, we make draws from the vector of 226 parameters attached to observed covariates only, since the 
parameters describing unobserved heterogeneity are not normally distributed; see Gaure et al. (2007). We thus 
condition on individual unobserved heterogeneity. Draws from the estimated parameter distribution are made by 
means of the Cholesky decomposition; that is, let L be a lower triangular matrix such that the covariance matrix is  20   
Figure 4: Simulated and observed employment rates by years since sampling and the immigrant 
native employment differential decomposed 
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Note: Solid lines denote mean employment rates (or employment differentials) from the model simulations; dotted 
lines upper and lower boundaries of 90 percent confidence intervals. In the upper panel, long-dashed lines display the 
observed fractions in the data. 
 
C.  Exit, re-entry, and duration dependence 
The lower panel of Figure 4 disentangles the immigrant-native employment differential into 
differences in exit and re-entry rates. The decomposition is obtained by making counterfactual 
simulations, such that immigrants are treated as if they were natives in the exit and re-entry 
processes, respectively. This exercise clearly shows that differences in exit rates are much more 
important than differences in re-entry rates for explaining the observed employment patterns. By 
the end of the period, 75 percent of the employment differential between immigrants and natives  
 
                                                                                                                                                              
' VL L = . Let zs be a vector of 226 parameter draws from the univariate standard normal distribution collected for 
trial s, and let  ˆ b  be the vector of point estimates. The parameter draws of trial s are then given by  ˆ
s s bb L z =+ .  21   
Table 3: Estimates of the impact of selected variables on exit and re-entry rates (marginal effects) 
 
 Immigrants  Natives 
  Exit Re-entry Exit Re-entry 
        
Mean observed transition rate 
in data (percent) 
6.09 13.34 2.31 29.08 
        
A. Duration dependence – 
time spent in present state 
    
1 year  Ref.=18.14  Ref.=46.81  Ref.=18.14  Ref.=46.81 
2 years  -2.05  -11.89*** -5.07*** -10.77*** 
3 years  -7.17***  -24.04*** -12.62*** -19.84*** 
        
B. Educational attainment       
Less than 10 years  Ref.=6.87  Ref.=23.13  Ref.=6.87  Ref.=23.13 
10-11 years  0.29  9.30*** -1.55*** 5.95*** 
12 years  -1.96***  11.48***  -3.58***  9.36*** 
13-15 years  -1.35*  10.74*** -2.25***  6.25*** 
16+ years  -0.92  13.52***  -3.58***  9.38*** 
        
C. Local unemployment rate  0.20*** -1.46*** 0.08***  -0.36** 
        
Note: Marginal effects for immigrants and natives are evaluated at the same initial transition probabilities defined by 
the observed mean transition rate in the pooled sample for the reference groups (panels A and B) and for all 
individuals (panel C). The reported numbers in Panel C are the estimated impacts of a one percentage point increase 
in the rate of unemployment. Local unemployment is tabulated from registers of the Public Employment Service and 
includes participants on active labor market programs. 
*(**)(***): Significant at the 10(5)(1) percent level. Coefficient estimates with standard errors appear in the Appendix. 
 
can be attributed to differences in exit rates alone, 20 percent to differences in re-entry rates 
alone, and 5 percent to the interaction of the two. 
There is a significant difference between immigrants and natives with respect to the 
degree of duration dependence; see Table 3, panel A. Extended periods outside employment 
entail declining re-entry probabilities for both immigrants and natives. During the first three years 
without employment, the average re-entry probability declines by 20 percentage points for natives 
and 24 percentage points for immigrants. For natives, the exit probability also drops sharply as a 
new employment spell extends beyond a year. After three years in a new spell the exit probability 
has declined by 13 percentage points for natives, compared to seven percentage points for 
immigrants.  As these parameters are identified by formerly employed individuals who re-enter 
employment, the patterns show that immigrants do not experience the same reduction in the risk 
of non-employment from lasting employment spells as do natives.   22   
D.  Returns to human capital 
For natives, the exit rate declines strongly with educational attainment; see Table 3, panel B. At 
typical levels of exit, the exit rates are more than twice as high for natives with compulsory 
schooling only than for those who completed high school (12 years) or obtained a university 
degree (at least 16 years). For immigrants, educational attainment has only a modest impact on 
the exit rate. Even though there is a positive impact of education on re-entry rates for both natives 
and immigrants, this finding indicates that it has been difficult for the labor migrants to take full 
advantage of their schooling in the Norwegian labor market.
14  
E.  Labor market dissimilation or differential age effects? 
Figure 5 displays the estimated impact of years since migration (YSM) on the probabilities of exit 
and re-entry. Although these profiles are estimated with considerable statistical uncertainty 
(caused by the difficulty of disentangling YSM from age effects), the figure shows that the exit 
rate out of employment rises significantly with years since migration, conditional on age and 
calendar year. Hence, the data give no indication of immigrant assimilation, in the sense that their 
attachment to employment becomes stronger – relative to that of natives – with time in the host 
country. To the contrary, the plot bears witness of a strong dissimilation process. According to 
the point estimates, the probability of exiting the labor market from one year to the next 
increases, ceteris paribus, from less than 2 percent during the first 10 years in the country, to 
more than 5 percent after 15 years. The re-entry probability, on the other hand, seems to be stable 
with respect to years since migration. 
                                                 
14 Friedberg (2000) documents limited portability of human capital acquired in the home country among immigrants 
in Israel, and Raaum (1998) shows that returns to schooling obtained abroad fall below returns to host-country 
schooling for immigrants in Norway. Bratsberg and Terrell (2002) attribute differences in returns to education across 
immigrant groups to variation in source-country school quality.  23   
Figure 5: Exit and re-entry probabilities by years since migration 














Note: Dotted lines indicate 90 percent confidence intervals. The probabilities are normalized to 
match the mean observed transition rates at YSM=5. 
 
  In Figure 6, we plot the estimated impact of age on exit and re-entry for immigrants and 
natives, respectively. The exit probabilities exhibit strongly U-shaped patterns with high exit rates 
at young and old ages, while the re-entry rate declines with age. Both of the exit and re-entry 
profiles are fairly similar for immigrants and natives. The rise in the exit rate associated with 
aging appears somewhat earlier for immigrants (around the age of 45) than for natives (around 
the age of 55), consistent with the pattern that immigrants who leave employment are more likely 
to enter an absorbing state such as disability pension retirement. 
F.  The role of business cycle fluctuations 
In Norway, the 1970s were characterized by high labor demand and extremely low 
unemployment; see Figure 7. During the 1980s, however, unemployment started to rise and – 
apart from a brief recovery in the mid 1980s – rose steadily until it reached its peak level in 1993.  24   
Figure 6: Exit and re-entry probabilities by age 
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Note: Dotted lines indicate 90 percent confidence intervals. The probabilities are normalized to 
match the mean observed transition rates at age 30, for immigrants and natives, respectively. 
 
Economic fluctuations enter our statistical model both through the calendar year dummies and 
through the inclusion of the local unemployment rate (given the difficulty of interpreting calendar 
time effects in isolation, we do not report these here; they are listed in the Appendix). Differential 
responsiveness of immigrants and natives to economic conditions is allowed for only through the 
effect of the local unemployment rate; see Table 3, Panel C. The estimates indicate that the 
degree of cyclicality in transition probabilities indeed differs between the two groups: Changes in 
local unemployment affect the immigrant transition probabilities significantly more than those of 
natives, both from a substantive and from a purely statistical point of view (the null hypothesis of 
equality of coefficients is rejected at the 5 percent level for both exit and re-entry probabilities). 
According to the estimates, the three percentage point increase in aggregate unemployment that 
occurred between the mid 1980s and the mid 1990s, raised the immigrant exit rate by 0.6 
percentage point and lowered their re-entry rate by 4.5 percentage points. For natives, the   25   
Figure 7: Unemployment rates in Norway 1971-2000 
 









Note: Standardized unemployment rates. Source: OECD. 
 
corresponding effects were only a 0.2 percentage point increase in the exit rate and a 1.1 
percentage point reduction in the re-entry rate.  
  Figure 8 illustrates the potential impact of business cycles on the immigrant-native 
employment differential, by comparing the results from model simulations made under the 
counterfactual assumption that the favorable cyclical conditions at the time of immigration 
continued throughout the sample period with simulations made using actual cyclical conditions. 
We examine two alternative counterfactual cyclical patterns. The first holds both unemployment 
rates and calendar time effects constant at their 1975-1980 averages. Realizing that calendar time 
effects not necessarily represent cyclical fluctuations only, but also other time trends in the data, 
we also study the impact of keeping only the local unemployment rates constant at their 1975-
1980 average. As the figure shows, the impact of cyclical fluctuations is much larger for 
immigrants than for natives. Had the favorable employment conditions of the late 1970s  26   
Figure 8: Immigrant-native employment differential under alternative cyclical environments 
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Note: Dotted lines indicate 90 percent confidence intervals.  
 
prevailed, the employment differential at the end of the sample period would have been half of 
the observed difference. The predicted immigrant employment rate after 27 years is raised from 
48 to 76 percent, and the native rate is raised from 88 to 96 percent (not shown in the figure). Had 
only local unemployment rates kept constant at their 1975-1980 average, the employment 
differential would have been reduced by about four percentage points (10 percent).  
  Given that calendar year effects are restricted to be the same for immigrants and natives, 
the large impact of holding calendar effects constant may appear surprising. To a certain extent, 
the finding simply mirrors the fact that the scope for increasing employment rates is smaller the 
closer they already are to unity (which is captured in the functional form of the probability 
function). But it also reflects that the long-term effects of an economic slowdown are more severe 
for immigrants than for natives. The reasons for this are, first, that immigrants more rapidly 
become disconnected from the labor market through a deterioration of re-employment prospects 
(i.e., they face a stronger negative duration dependence in re-entry rates), and, second, that even  27   
when they obtain a new job, it takes longer for the job to become secure (i.e., they have weaker 
negative duration dependence in exit rates than natives).  
 
IV. Mechanisms 
The strong decline in immigrant employment over the lifecycle, accompanied by high 
propensities to collect social security transfers such as disability pensions and rehabilitation 
assistance, raises concerns about increased labor immigration from developing countries as a 
panacea to battle the problems of an aging population. But the policy implications of our findings 
depend on the nature of underlying causal mechanism(s) and whether the circumstances faced by 
any future non-European labor immigrants are comparable to those of the cohort under study. 
This section discusses some key mechanisms that may explain our findings, such as 
disproportional sorting of immigrants into ‘bad’ jobs, immigrant-biased technological change, 
and weaker work incentives facing immigrants than natives. To shed light on these potential 
explanations, we exploit a number of additional data sources, among them micro data from the 
1980 Census (with information on occupation and industry in 1980, conditional on employment 
at that time) and a complete administrative register of social security payments since 1992. 
Because of limitations of the data, however, we emphasize that the ambition of this section is to 
present a body of convincing circumstantial empirical evidence rather than consistent estimates of 
causal mechanisms. 
A.  Health and employability  
Given that a large fraction of the non-employed labor migrants end up in disability retirement, an 
apparent explanation for the immigrant-native employment differential is that the migrant cohort 
has poorer health than the native control group. According to data from the national level of  28   
living surveys from 1995/96, there is, however, no general tendency for nonwestern immigrants 
to report higher frequencies of long-lasting health problems than natives (Blom and Ramm, 
1998). But, while younger immigrants (those below 45) report fewer health problems, older 
immigrants report more health problems than natives. Moreover, given that they have a long-
lasting health problem, a larger fraction of immigrants report that the problem limits their ability 
to work. The evidence from these health surveys thus fits the broad age pattern discussed in the 
prior section, showing that the increase in the exit rate from employment starts at a younger age 
and is slightly larger for immigrants than for natives (see Figure 6). 
Based on our own administrative data, we can address the health hypothesis indirectly by 
examining mortality rates for the immigrant and native samples during the five-year period after 
2000 (i.e., conditional on survival through 2000 and not having outmigrated by the end of 
2005).
15  These mortality data reveal only minor differences between the two groups: the overall 
mortality rate is 3.3 percent for the migrant group and 3.4 percent for the native control group. As 
in the health survey data cited above, we find signs of a steeper age gradient for immigrants. To 
illustrate, for the two oldest birth cohorts (those born in 1936 and 1937) the five-year mortality 
rate was 13.6 percent among immigrants and 9.2 among natives. Conversely, for those born after 
1942, mortality was slightly lower for migrants than for natives (2.5 vs. 2.7 percent)—although 
these group differences are not statistically significant even at the ten percent level. Further, if we 
restrict our employment analyses to those born after 1942, the differences between native and 
immigrant profiles remain large. Between 1980 and 2000, the immigrant employment rate for the 
                                                 
15 Non-employment and disability pension uptake may of course be caused by less severe health issues, but it turns 
out that post-2000 mortality correlates strongly with prior employment status. For example, in 1990 the employment 
rate was ten percentage points lower among those who died in the 2001-2005 period than among those still alive by 
the end of 2005 (.62 vs. .72 among immigrants and .82 vs. .92 among natives).   29   
younger birth cohorts fell from 97 to 56 percent, compared to a decline from 95 to 89 percent for 
natives. In conclusion, even though immigrants report more work-limiting health problems and 
their health gradient appears to be steeper than that of natives, the overall health differences 
between the two groups are too small for health to be the dominant explanation of the 
employment dissimilation among immigrants. 
B.  Cultural retirement determinants 
The short employment careers may reflect that some of the labor migrants are equipped with 
cultural norms from their home country regarding the ‘normal’ age of retirement that deviate 
from the relatively high retirement age in Norway. As such, participation patterns may develop 
independently of employment location. There is indeed substantial evidence indicating that 
country of origin is one of the most important factors for explaining labor market assimilation of 
immigrants in industrialized countries (Bauer et al., 2000). Moreover, studies of labor force 
participation in the United States attribute part of the variation to cultural factors. For example, 
Antecol (2000) finds that patterns of employment in the immigrant population relate to employment 
rates in the source country, and Fernández (2007) shows that hours worked among second-generation 
American women correlate with cultural proxies such as female labor force participation and survey-
based evidence on attitudes towards women’s work in the country of ancestry.  
Employment patterns in the source countries of the immigrants covered by our study do, 
however, not lend support to the idea that the labor migrants brought with them a culture for early 
retirement. As it turns out, we find no decline in the employment propensities among 45-64 year 
old males in these countries that resembles the pattern observed for the migrant cohort in 
Norway. For example, the 2003-2004 employment rates (i.e., labor force participation adjusted 
for unemployment) for males in Pakistan’s Punjab region were 0.94 for those aged 45-49, 0.92 
for ages 50-54, 0.86 for ages 55-59, and 0.76 for the 60-64 age group (Pakistan Federal Bureau of  30   
Statistics, 2004). If anything, these figures resemble those of our native-born reference group, not 
the cohort of labor migrants. Moreover, these patterns are consistent with the evidence from 
estimation of the dynamic model of the previous section, showing that the immigrant-native 
employment differential primarily evolves with years since migration, and not age. 
C.  Differences in jobs and immigrant-biased technological change  
One potential explanation for the poor long-term employment performance of immigrants holds 
that they were overrepresented in dead-end jobs, for which there was a high probability of 
subsequent job loss. This explanation is consistent with the high and cyclical immigrant exit from 
employment identified in section III. A related hypothesis holds that skill-biased technological 
change (SBTC) reduced the demand for low-skilled manual labor and increased the demand for 
communication skills. For example, Autor et al. (2003) argue that computer technologies have 
substituted for workers performing tasks that can be accomplished by following explicit rules, 
and increased demand for workers performing non-routine problem solving and complex 
communications tasks. Such developments may have harmed the employment prospects of 
nonwestern immigrants in general and minority labor migrants recruited by manufacturing 
industry in the early 1970s in particular. In fact, recent evidence from Norway shows that relative 
employment prospects of persons in the lower tail of the wage distribution, conditional on work 
experience and educational attainment, deteriorated during the 1990s (Røed and Nordberg, 2004). 
Moreover, as argued by Rosholm et al. (2006), changes in organizational structure toward more 
flexible work organizations may have increased the importance of language proficiency and other 
country-specific skills and, thus, reduced the attractiveness of immigrant employees over time. 
Our empirical checks of these explanations build on analyses of a subset of the full sample 
for which we are able to match additional information about job and employment characteristics  31   
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collected from the 1980 Census (and conditional on employment that year).
16 If initial job 
characteristics explain the decline in immigrant employment, the immigrant-native differential 
during the late 1980s and 1990s should drop significantly when we compare workers with similar 
jobs. The upper panels of Figure 9 display employment profiles for immigrants and natives 
within broadly defined occupational groups. These panels clearly show that the immigrant-native 
employment differentials remain large even conditional on initial occupation. It may be the case 
that immigrants were more likely to get jobs in firms and industries with shrinking employment 
                                                 
16 We use 1980 data to proxy for the initial job, although surely many of the labor migrants by that date had changed 
jobs from their initial employer. Unfortunately, we are unable to track jobs during the 1970s. We note however that 
the Norwegian labor market was remarkably stable during the late 1970s with the unemployment rate averaging 1.7 
percent (see Figure 7), and that 97 percent of the migrants were employed in 1980.The matching with census records 
yielded a slightly older immigrant sample, and we therefore re-stratified the native reference group to match the age 
distribution of the new sample.  32   
within these broad occupations, e.g., because they were rewarded less than natives for their 
educational investments (as seen in the estimation results presented in Section III D). To assess 
this hypothesis, the upper panels of the figure add employment profiles for native comparison 
groups consisting of individuals with primary education only. It is evident that the large 
immigrant-native employment differentials persist even with this low-skill native comparison 
group, suggesting that only a small proportion of the employment gap can be attributed to 
differences in valuation of schooling.
17 
The employment profiles in the upper panel of Figure 9 show that the strongest 
employment reductions among natives during the 1980s and 1990s were recorded for craftsmen 
and operators. As it turns out, in 1980 the migrant group was strongly overrepresented in these 
occupations; 46 percent of the migrants held craftsmen and operator jobs (typically in the 
manufacturing sector). Hence, it is indeed the case that immigrants were disproportionally 
employed in declining industries. On the other hand, the immigrants’ own employment 
propensities declined even more in other sectors of the economy. And the relative decline was 
greatest in service and trade occupations. The latter finding is consistent with the hypothesis that 
migrants were harmed by increasing emphasis on language skills over time.  
One might expect that more educated immigrants are less affected by technological 
change and increased relative demand for high-skilled labor, and, hence, that the immigrant-
native employment differential should diminish with attainment. The lower panels of Figure 9 
display employment profiles by educational attainment. The graphs clearly show that the decline  
                                                 
17 We have also constructed an alternative native comparison group by matching on earnings in 1980. The motivation 
behind this exercise is to investigate whether our results are driven by the native group having better jobs than the 
migrants, conditional on occupation and education. As it turns out, the employment profile of this alternative 
comparison group sits slightly below, but is barely distinguishable from the comparison groups used in Figure 9.  33   
in employment over time was most severe for the least educated, and this is true for both 
immigrants and natives. There remains a substantial employment differential at the end of the 
period within each education group, however, and it is interesting to note that while the 
employment rate declined by only four percentage points among highly educated natives, it 
declined by 36 percentage points among similarly educated immigrants. In comparison, the 
largest employment decline for any of the native groups in the figure is 18 percentage points 
(natives with compulsory schooling only).  
The occupational and educational classifications in Figure 9 are quite broad, and may 
therefore conceal important differences between the immigrant and native distributions at a more 
detailed level. As we narrow the classifications, it indeed turns out that initial job and education 
characteristics account for a significant part of the subsequent immigrant-native employment 
differential. This is documented in Table 4 where we use linear probability regressions to address 
the extent to which the employment differential in 2000 can be explained by variation in job 
attributes, as captured by 69 occupations, six levels of educational attainment, 41 industries, 19 
regions, and pay, all measured 20 years earlier. Again, the analysis is based on those in the 
census-matched samples who were employed in 1980. In panel A we report the coefficient of the 
immigrant indicator variable in the 2000 employment regressions when immigrants and natives 
samples are weighted so as to have equal importance in the regression. We see first that the 
overall sample differential in 2000 of 0.406 is reduced to 0.324 when we condition on job 
attributes (column 2). If we further impose immigrant returns to education to be zero (which 
implies a differential relative to natives with primary schooling only), the estimate falls to 0.274 
(column 3). In other words, differences in 1980 job types explain 20 to 33 percent of the 
difference in employment in 2000. Panel B lists the same coefficients in the un-weighted sample.   34   
Table 4: Year 2000 employment regressions, immigrant-native differential 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
        
A. Weighted   -.406  -.324 -.274 -.282 -.238 -.187 
Regression (.009)  (.013)  (.015) (.010) (.014) (.015) 
        
Adj R
2 .191  .258  .235  .235 .286 .269 
        
        
B. Unweighted   -.406  -.345 -.302 -.316 -.280 -.236 
Regression (.009)  (.013)  (.014) (.011) (.014) (.015) 
        
Adj R
2 .154  .203  .193  .185 .221 .213 
        
        















        
Note: Standard errors are reported in parentheses. Coefficient estimates are based on linear probability models; 
sample size is 11,230. The vector of job attributes includes indicator variables for industry (41), occupation (69), 
county of residence (19), educational attainment (6), and average pay over the 1980-84 period. The family structure 
controls include whether married with spouse present in 2000, whether spouse is a homemaker, and 9 indicator 
variables for number of children ever born. In columns (3) and (6), immigrant schooling is set to equal to primary 
education. Panel A weights regressions so that immigrant and native subsamples receive equal weight. 
 
In the un-weighted regression, a smaller part of the immigrant-native employment differential is 
accounted for by differences in job attributes (0.061 vs. 0.082 in column 2), reflecting the fact 
that coefficient estimates of control variables in general are larger when based on the immigrant 
sample. 
In sum, we find that the decline in employment over time was much larger for less 
educated than for highly educated workers, and that differences in the 1980 job distributions of 
immigrants and natives account for a sizable share of the observed employment differential in 
2000. Such empirical patterns are consistent with the hypotheses that the labor migrants initially 
were recruited into jobs in declining industries and that their employment careers were adversely 
affected by skill-biased technological change. Yet, these explanations do not fully account for the 
relative decline in immigrant employment, as there remain sizeable unexplained immigrant-native 
employment differentials regardless of educational attainment or initial job type.   35   
D.  Welfare program incentives 
A generous welfare state might undermine work incentives, and several features of the 
Norwegian system may give the immigrant population less economic gain from employment than 
natives.
18 First, immigrant wages tend to be lower, and they therefore typically face higher social 
security replacement ratios in a welfare system with relatively high minimum benefits. Second, 
the family structure of many immigrant households makes them eligible for supplementary 
benefits if they are temporarily out of work or become permanently disabled. As we show below, 
family-related allowances can have a considerable impact on the financial incentives embedded 
in the social security system. 
One way to assess the overall role of family structure is again to consider employment 
status in 2000 and calculate the proportion of the immigrant-native differential that can be 
attributed to family characteristics that are relevant for welfare benefits; see Table 4, column (4). 
When the regression controls for marital status, whether or not the spouse is a homemaker, and 
the number of children ever born, the 2000 employment differential drops from 0.406 to 0.282 (in 
the weighted regression), implying that differences in family structure explain more than 30 
percent of the observed differences in employment status. In column (5), we combine job and 
family characteristics, which lowers the differential even further. And, in column (6), we use the 
most extensive model specification along with the restriction that immigrant returns to education 
are zero, which reduces the differential by approximately one half. Based on the last column, one 
can assess the marginal effects of job attributes versus the family structure controls. This exercise 
shows that omitting the family structure variables or omitting the job controls from the  
                                                 
18 Moreover, work disincentive effects are likely to be reinforced by network effects transmitting information about 
welfare programs within the immigrant group (Borjas and Hilton, 1996; Bertrand et al., 2000).  36   
specification raises the immigrant-native differential by substantial amounts. For example, 
comparing the estimates listed in columns (3), (4), and (6), the marginal contribution of job 
attributes equals 23 (panel A) or 20 percent (panel B) of the overall differential, while the 
contribution of family structure is 21 or 16 percent. According to these numbers, the two sets of 
factors account for similar shares of the observed immigrant-native employment differential.  
To gain insight into the mechanisms behind the role played by family structure, it is useful 
to consider the details of the welfare system. In particular, the disability pension system is 
comprised of means-tested payments for dependent spouses and children. These extra benefits 
can be quite substantial; currently (2008-2009) up to NOK 35,000 (about $5,800) per year for a 
dependent spouse and NOK 28,000 for each child, and these benefits come on top of a 
replacement ratio that is already around two thirds of prior earnings and are subject to preferential 
tax treatment.
19 As a result, low-wage earners with many children can obtain effective 
replacement ratios that exceed 100 percent. This point is illustrated in Table 5, where we report 
actual disability pension payments and two alternative measures of replacement ratios before tax 
for disability claimants in our two samples in 2000. (Note that net replacement ratios will be 
higher than those listed in the table, as disability benefits are taxed at a lower rate than labor 
earnings.) As the table documents, disability benefits rise sharply with the number of children. 
Among immigrants with four or more children, 8.9 percent of the disabled actually receive a 
higher annual income from pensions than they ever earned in the labor market, and as many as 
63.7 percent have a higher income on disability retirement than they had on average while active 
in the labor market. The relationship between replacement ratios and family structure is fairly  
                                                 
19 The child allowance was raised from 25 to 40 percent of the social security base amount in 2002. Means-testing 
was introduced in 1992.  37   
Table 5: Permanent disability pension benefits in 2000 relative to prior earnings 
              
 Immigrants  Natives 










all years employed 
 Benefits 












































ratio > 1 
           
           
All  159  .547 .031 .854 .262 139  .505 .016 .855 .190 
    (.238)   (.360)     (.215)   (.544)  
           
By #children in 2000: 
 
0 131  .455 .005 .711 .089 138  .500 .014 .846 .174 
    (.159)   (.250)     (.211)   (.547)  
               
1 149  .516 .022 .795 .189 140  .510 .019 .861 .212 
    (.213)   (.293)     (.225)   (.530)  
               
2 160  .564 .014 .878 .266 145  .532 .016 .896 .262 
    (.216)   (.343)     (.219)   (.465)  
               
3 184  .614 .066 .977 .401 144 .555  .031  1.036  .415 
    (.220)   (.341)     (.232)   (.664)  
               
4+ 212  .722  .089 1.126  .637 185  .647 .083  1.107 .625 
    (.335)   (.488)     (.301)   (.479)  
            
Note: Standard deviations are reported in parentheses. Samples consist of individuals who received permanent 
disability pension benefits in 2000. Samples are further restricted to individuals with at least five years of prior labor 
market earnings and whose average earnings in the three best years were at least 2G (i.e., the equivalent of NOK 
98,180 in 2000). Number of children refers to children aged 0-17 in 2000.  
 
similar for immigrants and natives. The major difference in financial incentives arises from the 
fact that immigrants and natives tend to have very different family structures. For example, while 
only 10 percent of the native men have four or more children, this is the case for 52 percent of the 
migrants. And while only 20 percent of the married native men have a non-working spouse in 
2000, this is the case for no less than 70 percent of the migrants. 
Existing empirical evidence from Norway indicates that employment decisions are indeed 
responsive towards financial incentives, particularly within relatively poor households. Aaberge 
et al. (2000) estimate participation elasticities for married couples by household income, and  38   
report that, in the lowest decile, the husband’s participation elasticity with respect to own net 
wage is as high as 1.89, compared to an average elasticity of 0.17.
20  If disability insurance is a 
viable alternative to work, the benefit calculation rules imply that male household heads of 
families with many children and a non-working spouse have little to gain from labor market 
participation, and, hence, are less likely to work and more likely to be on disability. The patterns 
in Figure 10 are striking and strongly confirm these predictions. The first three columns contrast 
the employment and disability rates over time for household heads according to their number of 
children. The panels reveal clear associations between employment and disability patterns and the 
number of children, where more children go hand in hand with lower employment and higher 
disability rates. To illustrate, while six of ten immigrant fathers with one or two children are 
employed in 2000, fewer than four in ten are employed among those with more than four 
children. And, while about 35 percent of immigrant fathers with one or two children are disabled 
in 2000, close to 60 percent of those with many children receive a disability pension. Similarly, 
native men with four or more children are twice as likely to be on disability as those with fewer 
children. 
To address the role the spouse’s work status, the final two columns of Figure 10 sketch 
trends in employment and disability for married men with and without a dependent spouse. The 
panels show that the wife’s work status correlates strongly with own employment and disability 
status. Roughly speaking, towards the end of the sample period those with a dependent spouse are  
                                                 
20 There is to our knowledge little direct empirical evidence on the impacts of financial incentives embedded in the 
disability insurance system on labor supply in Norway or the other Nordic countries. Evidence collected from the 
unemployment insurance system (Røed and Zhang, 2003; 2005) and the vocational rehabilitation system (Nordberg, 
2008) suggests that social insurance parameters do have significant impacts on employment propensities. Quasi-
experimental evidence from Canada presented in Gruber (2000) indicates that the elasticity of non-participation with 
respect to disability insurance benefits is around 0.3. Autor and Duggan (2006) list the rise in the benefit replacement 
rate as one of three factors contributing to the increase in US disability enrollment since 1984.   39   


















































































































Note: Samples consist of married individuals with a spouse present in 2000. Number of children refers to children 
ever born. Sample sizes for immigrants and natives, respectively, are 495 and 14,362 (1-2 children); 1122 and 8767 
(3-4 children); 736 and 771 (more than 4 children); 705 and 20,158 (spouse works); and 1675 and 4810 (spouse 
homemaker).  Note that employment and disability states are not mutually exclusive, reflecting transitions during the 
year as well as partial disability (see also Table 2).  
 
twice as likely to be non-employed and on disability compared to those with a working spouse, 
and this is the case for both immigrants and natives. 
The employment careers of migrants’ spouses will also affect the fiscal consequences of 
labor immigration directly. Figure 11 compares the employment patterns over time for spouses of 
the labor migrants under study and the native comparison group. The two groups exhibit 
strikingly different trends over the sample period.
21  While the spouses of natives follow the  
                                                 
21 The trend line for immigrant spouses confounds years-since-migration and cohort effects. Sixty-one percent of the 
immigrant spouses were present in Norway in 1980, and their employment rate declined from 40 percent in 1981 to 
34 percent in 2000. Employment rates for spouses who arrived during the 1980s increased from 19 percent in 1991 to 
25 percent in 2000.  40   





























Note: Samples consist of 2380 spouses of immigrants and 24,968 spouses of natives. Employment rate is 
conditional on residence in Norway and age between 25 and 64. 
 
general development of rising female labor supply, this is not true for the spouses of the migrant 
group. And, in 2000, the immigrant-native employment differential for spouses is as large as 50 
percentage points.
22 Differences between immigrants and natives in family structure, paired with 
the strong work disincentives for heads of large households embedded in welfare benefits, 
therefore seem to play a significant role in explaining the relative decline in employment among 
labor migrants.  
It is important to stress that the evidence presented in this section is not based on data that 
allow us to isolate the underlying causal impacts. Family size will reflect preferences and may  
                                                 
22 Looking at the combined population of married labor migrants and their spouses, we find that 40 percent were 
employed in 2000, while 61 percent claimed at least one type of social security transfer. Fifty-five percent of the 
immigrant households had at least one person receiving a permanent disability pension, compared to 25 percent for 
the native comparison group.  41   
correlate with unobserved determinants of wages, health, and employability, although it is hard to 
find reasons why men with many children should be less productive or more prone to severe 
health problems than men with fewer children. Family structure follows from fertility choices and 
spousal employment status reflects joint household labor supply decisions. Thus, we cannot rule 
out the reverse causal links where favorable benefit replacement ratios for household heads with 
large families affect both spousal labor supply and fertility.
23 Nonetheless, if family structure and 
spousal labor supply are influenced by benefit rules, there is an additional effect of the welfare 
system operating through its impact on behavior to meet eligibility criteria. The assessment of 
fiscal consequences of labor immigration would therefore be similar even if welfare policy had a 
causal effect on fertility and spousal labor market participation in migrant households.  
  
V. Conclusion 
Male labor migrants from developing countries who came to Norway during the early 1970s had 
extremely short employment careers compared to a matched reference group of natives. Based on 
estimation of a simultaneous transition model between the states of employment and non-
employment, we have found that the disparity in employment profiles between immigrants and 
natives primarily results from differences in non-employment incidence. Differential non-
employment persistence also plays a role, particularly during economic downturns. The 
immigrant-native employment differential evolves chiefly as a function of years since migration, 
and only modestly from differences in age-employment profiles. We also identify a strong 
                                                 
23 A large literature examines the impact of public policy on fertility. Hoem (2008) summarizes the evidence from 
recent European studies, and, although pointing to “demonstrated policy effects in specific circumstances” (p. 249), 
emphasizes the formidable methodological challenges facing this literature. Hardoy and Schøne (2008) conclude that 
the ‘cash-for-care’ subsidy during the first two years after birth introduced in Norway in 1998 affected the fertility 
behavior of native women, but not the fertility of immigrant women from non-OECD countries.  42   
sensitivity of immigrant employment to business cycle fluctuations, and the long-term effect of 
an economic slowdown is more severe for immigrants than for natives. Immigrants are more 
rapidly disconnected from the labor market through deterioration of their re-employment 
prospects, and, when they obtain a new job, it takes longer to attain job security.  
We uncover evidence consistent with the hypotheses that the labor migrants initially were 
recruited into jobs in declining industries and that their employment careers were adversely 
affected by skill-biased technological change. For example, differences in the 1980 job 
distributions of immigrants and natives account for up to one third of the observed employment 
differential in 2000. We also point out that the welfare system, with high benefit replacement 
ratios for household heads with a non-working spouse and many children, provides poor work 
incentives for families of the type that dominates the cohort of labor migrants. A surprisingly 
large fraction of the immigrant-native employment differential in 2000 can be attributed to 
differences in household characteristics: conditioning on family size and spousal employment 
status reduces the predicted differential by more than 30 percent. Although we hesitate 
interpreting this as evidence of a causal link, family characteristics explain as much of the 
immigrant-native employment differential as do 1980 job attributes.  
Notwithstanding the problems of ranking the possible explanations, our results clearly 
indicate that early minority labor migrants to Norway have found it difficult or not worthwhile to 
sustain employment careers comparable to those of natives. From a policy perspective, one might 
question whether this finding has any bearing on admission policies of rich, welfare-state 
economies of today. Such concerns about external validity fall under two headings. First, one 
could argue that labor migrants today are carefully selected on the basis of skill and therefore will 
be better capable of sustaining lifecycle employment in the host country. However, although 
authorities can set admission criteria with respect to documented skills such as educational  43   
attainment, it is difficult to eliminate self-selection based on, e.g., unobserved disability 
propensity. Also, one cannot easily impose skill requirements on subsequent family reunification. 
But, perhaps more important, the evidence presented in this paper is not built on a particularly 
negatively selected wave of immigrants. And our results show that immigrant-native differences 
in lifecycle employment are large regardless of educational attainment.  
The second challenge to external validity comes from the argument that economic 
conditions have changed, and that the cyclical turbulence and industry restructuring of the 1980s 
and 1990s will not repeat itself. Labor migrants of today will surely work in other industries and 
face different economic environments than their predecessors. But cyclical fluctuations are not 
yet history, and there is no sign that structural change in employment across industries has 
become less intense over time. Portability of skills and language proficiency are no less important 
today. And the work disincentives embedded in the social insurance system, particularly for 
household types that are prevalent in many potential source populations, remain in place. 
What this paper shows, is that initial employment upon arrival is no guarantee for lifetime 
employment. The poor long-run performance of the minority labor migrants followed in this 
study suggests that opening the border is not a panacea to solving the fiscal problems associated 
with an aging population. This cheerless conclusion is even more apparent if we also take into 
account the dismal employment record of the spouses of the labor migrants. To the extent that 
immigration policy is used to remedy demographic imbalances, it is essential that such policy is 
combined with a strategy to ensure a better and more stable utilization of the extra human 
resources.   44   
References 
Aaberge, Rolf, Ugo Colombino, and Steinar Strøm (2000), Labor Supply Responses and Welfare 
Effects from Replacing Current Tax Rules by a Flat Tax: Empirical Evidence from Italy, 
Norway and Sweden, Journal of Population Economics, 13(4), 595-621. 
Antecol, Heather (2000), An Examination of Cross-country Differences in the Gender Gap in 
Labor Force Participation Rates, Labour Economics 7(4), 409-26.  
Autor, David H., Frank Levy, and Richard J. Murnane (2003), The Skill Content of Recent 
Technological Change: An Empirical Exploration, Quarterly Journal of Economics, 
118(4), 1279-1333. 
Autor, David H, and Mark G. Duggan (2006), The Growth in the Social Security Disability Rolls: 
A Fiscal Crisis Unfolding, Journal of Economic Perspectives, 20(3), 71-96. 
Barth, Erling, Bernt Bratsberg, and Oddbjørn Raaum (2004), Identifying Earnings Assimilation 
of Immigrants under Changing Macroeconomic Conditions, Scandinavian Journal of 
Economics, 106(1), 1-22. 
Bauer, Thomas K., Magnus Lofstrom, and Klaus F. Zimmermann (2000), Immigration Policy, 
Assimilation of Immigrants, and Natives' Sentiments towards Immigrants: Evidence from 
12 OECD Countries, Swedish Economic Policy Review, 7, 11-53.  
Bertrand, Marianne, Erzo F.P. Luttmer, and Sendhil Mullainathan (2000), Network Effects and 
Welfare Cultures, Quarterly Journal of Economics, 115(3), 1019-55. 
Blom, Svein, and Jorun Ramm (1998), Ikke-vestlige innvandreres helse: Ikke flere syke, men når 
de først blir syke…, Samfunnsspeilet, No. 3. 
Borjas, George J. (1987), Self-Selection and the Earnings of Immigrants, American Economic 
Review, 77, 531-53. 
Borjas, George J. (1999), The Economic Analysis of Immigration, in O. Ashenfelter and D. Card, 
eds., Handbook of Labor Economics, Vol. 3, Amsterdam: Elsevier. 
Borjas, George J., and Bernt Bratsberg (1996), Who Leaves? The Outmigration of the Foreign-
Born, Review of Economics and Statistics, 78(1), 165-76. 
Borjas, George J., and Lynette Hilton (1996), Immigration and the Welfare State: Immigrant 
Participation in Means-Tested Entitlement Programs, Quarterly Journal of Economics, 
111(2), 575-604. 
Bratsberg, Bernt, Erling Barth, and Oddbjørn Raaum (2006), Local Unemployment and the 
Relative Wages of Immigrants: Evidence from the Current Population Surveys, The 
Review of Economics and Statistics, 88(2), 243-63.   45   
Bratsberg, Bernt, Oddbjørn Raaum, and Kjetil Sørlie (2007), Foreign-born Migration to and from 
Norway, in Caglar Ozden and Maurice Schiff (eds.), International Migration, Economic 
Development, & Policy, New York: World Bank and Palgrave Macmillan. 
Bratsberg, Bernt, and Dek Terrell (2002), School Quality and Returns to Education of U.S. 
Immigrants, Economic Inquiry 40(2), 177-98. 
Castles, Stephen (2006), Guestworkers in Europe: A Resurrection? International Migration 
Review, 40(4), 741-66. 
Chiswick, Barry R. (1978), The Effect of Americanization of the Earnings of Foreign-born Men, 
Journal of Political Economy, 86, 897-921. 
Commission of the European Communities (2005), Green Paper on an EU Approach to 
Managing Economic Migration, COM(2004) 811 Final, Brussels: EU Commission. 
Dahl, Svenn Å., Øivind A. Nilsen, and Kjell Vaage (2000), Work or Retirement? Exit Routes for 
Norwegian Elderly, Applied Economics, 32(14), 1865-76.  
Edin, Per A., Robert J. LaLonde, and Olof Åslund (2000), Emigration of immigrants and 
measures of immigrant assimilation: Evidence from Sweden, Swedish Economic Policy 
Review, 7, 163-204.  
Fernandez, Rachel (2007), Women, Work and Culture, Journal of the European Economic 
Association, 5(2-3), 305-32. 
 
Friedberg, Rachel M. (2000), You Can't Take It with You? Immigrant Assimilation and the 
Portability of Human Capital, Journal of Labor Economics, 18(2), 221-51. 
Gaure, Simen, Knut Røed, and Tao Zhang (2007), Time and Causality: A Monte Carlo 
Assessment of the Timing-of-Events Approach, Journal of Econometrics, 141, 1159–95. 
Gruber, Jonathan (2000), Disability Insurance Benefits and Labor Supply, Journal of Political 
Economy, 108(6), 1162-83. 
Hansen, Jorgen, and Magnus Lofstrom (2003), Immigrant Assimilation and Welfare 
Participation: Do Immigrants Assimilate Into or Out of Welfare? Journal of Human 
Resources, 38(1), 74-98. 
Hardoy, Ines, and Pål Schøne (2008), Cash for Care: More work for the stork? Manuscript, 
Institute for Social Research. 
Heckman, James and Burton Singer (1984), A Method for Minimizing the Impact of 
Distributional Assumptions in Econometric Models for Duration Data, Econometrica, 52, 
271-320. 
Hoem, Jan (2008), The impact of public policies on European fertility, Demographic Research, 
19(10), 249-60.  46   
Husted, Leif, Helena S. Nielsen, Michael Rosholm, and Nina Smith (2001), Employment and 
Wage Assimilation of Male First Generation Immigrants in Denmark, International 
Journal of Manpower, 22, 39-68. 
Lindsay, Bruce G. (1983), The Geometry of Mixture Likelihoods: A General Theory, The Annals 
of Statistics, Vol. 11(1), 86-94. 
Nordberg, Morten (2008) Employment Behaviour of Marginal Workers: The Roles of 
Preferences and Opportunities, Labour, Vol. 22 (3), 411-45 
OECD (2001), The Employment of Foreigners: Outlook and Issues in OECD Countries, Chapter 
5 in OECD Employment Outlook, Paris: OECD (June). 
Pakistan Federal Bureau of Statistics (2004), Labor Force Survey 2003–2004: Twenty fourth 
issue, Islamabad: Federal Bureau of Statistics. 
Raaum, Oddbjørn (1998), Returns to Education and Norwegian Language Skills among 
Immigrants in Norway, Oslo: SNF-Oslo. 
Riaz, Wasim K. (2003), Realizing the Dream on Norwegian Benefits (‘Oppfyller drømmen på 
norsk trygd,’ in Norwegian), Aftenposten, February 14. 
Riphahn, Regina T. (2004), Immigrant Participation in Social Assistance Programs: Evidence 
from German Guestworkers, Applied Economics Quarterly, Vol. 50(4), 329-62. 
Rosholm, Michael, Kirk Scott, and Leif Husted (2006), The Times They are A-Changin': 
Declining Immigrant Employment Opportunities in Scandinavia, International Migration 
Review, 40(2), 318-47. 
Røed, Knut, and Morten Nordberg (2004), Have the Relative Employment Prospects for the Low-
Skilled Deteriorated After All? Journal of Population Economics, 17, 67-82.  
Røed, Knut, and Tao Zhang (2003) Does Unemployment Compensation Affect Unemployment 
Duration? The Economic Journal, 113, 190-206 
Røed, Knut, and Tao Zhang (2005) Unemployment Duration and Economic Incentives - A Quasi 
Random-Assignment Approach. European Economic Review, 49, 1799-1825. 
 
Storesletten, Kjetil (2000), Sustaining Fiscal Policy Through Immigration, Journal of Political 
Economy, 108(2), 300-23. 
Storesletten, Kjetil (2003), Fiscal Implication of Immigration - a Net Present Value Calculation, 
Scandinavian Journal of Economics, 105(3), 487-506. 
Tjelmeland, Hallvard, and Grete Brochmann (2003), Norsk innvandringshistorie: Bind 3, I 
globaliseringens tid (Norwegian Immigration History: Volume 3, In the Age of 
Globalization), Oslo: Pax.  47   
Appendix Table A1: Nonparametric Maximum Likelihood Estimation Results, 
Employment Status Transitions 
 
          
A.  Parameters assumed to be common for immigrants and natives 
 
    From employment to non-
employment 
From non-employment to 
employment 
        
    Coefficient Std  Error Coefficient Std  Error 
        
Calendar  year        
1971    0.1025 0.0767    
1972    0.1468 0.0735 -0.4394 0.1477 
1973    -0.0156 0.0734 -0.2531 0.1337 
1974    -0.0551 0.0709 -0.0864 0.1258 
1975    0.0513 0.0684 -0.3949 0.1201 
1976    -0.0956 0.0700 -0.0089 0.1159 
1977    -0.2956 0.0728 -0.0195 0.1151 
1978    -0.1377 0.0700 -0.0372 0.1168 
1979    -0.0076 0.0689 -0.3224 0.1128 
1980   Ref.    Ref.   
1981    -0.0055 0.0694 -0.2829 0.1126 
1982    0.2935 0.0660 -0.5050 0.1128 
1983    0.2387 0.0692 -0.6158 0.1093 
1984    0.3106 0.0689 -0.6018 0.1123 
1985    0.2539 0.0707 -0.5620 0.1097 
1986    0.5125 0.0675 -0.5459 0.1082 
1987    0.4741 0.0687 -0.7011 0.1079 
1988    0.6907 0.0673 -0.9394 0.1099 
1989    0.6415 0.0710 -0.8412 0.1132 
1990    0.6612 0.0736 -1.0420 0.1155 
1991    0.5235 0.0770 -1.0186 0.1172 
1992    0.7729 0.0770 -1.0159 0.1214 
1993    0.6291 0.0793 -1.2768 0.1226 
1994    0.5196 0.0802 -0.9764 0.1199 
1995    0.4596 0.0799 -0.9517 0.1195 
1996    0.4333 0.0801 -1.1591 0.1206 
1997    0.5386 0.0786 -1.0821 0.1179 
1998    0.5796 0.0787 -1.0335 0.1184 
1999    0.5674 0.0796 -1.1526 0.1205 
2000    0.6631 0.0800 -1.1783 0.1209 
Region         
Oslo    Ref.  Ref.  
East excl Oslo    -0.1007 0.0351 0.1103 0.0466 
Inland    0.0046 0.0433 0.0638 0.0587 
South    -0.0383 0.0533 0.0845 0.0691 
West    -0.2449 0.0345 0.1558 0.0476 
Central    -0.1652 0.0388 0.3290 0.0525 
North    0.2098 0.0415 0.2922 0.0535 
Local        
 unemployment    3.4096 0.6483 -1.9743 0.9485 
Unobserved        
 heterogeneity    8 support points in the discrete distribution (results not reported)  48   
 
 
B. Parameters that are allowed to differ for immigrants and natives 
 
 Immigrants  Natives 
    












      
  Coeff. S.E. Coeff. S.E. Coeff. S.E. Coeff. S.E. 
          
          
YSM          
3  -0.3016  0.3250        
4  -0.2506 0.2849 0.0171 0.6982        
5  Ref.   Ref.       
6  0.0504  0.2722  -0.6860 0.6861     
7  0.2981 0.2535 0.0799 0.5387        
8  0.3929  0.2501  -0.2033 0.6054     
9  0.3303  0.2499  -0.2770 0.5684     
10  0.6113  0.2471  -0.5377 0.5499     
11  0.8031  0.2438  -0.5450 0.5642     
12  1.1217  0.2383  -0.4233 0.5673     
13  1.2321  0.2426  -0.3484 0.5620     
14  1.3603  0.2418  -0.8304 0.5643     
15  1.2956  0.2484  -0.5634 0.5599     
16  1.3300  0.2535  -0.6770 0.5646     
17  1.2663  0.2557  -0.7263 0.5777     
18  1.3797  0.2623  -0.6011 0.5807     
19  1.5643  0.2683  -0.5220 0.5842     
20  1.2791  0.2738  -0.4207 0.5839     
21  1.3186  0.2772  -0.5999 0.5915     
22  1.3609  0.2813  -0.2227 0.5872     
23  1.3885  0.2767  -0.6581 0.5935     
24  1.2900  0.2759  -0.3309 0.5821     
25  1.1701  0.2830  -0.3699 0.5833     
26  1.2113  0.2873  -0.2643 0.5876     
27  1.3585  0.2948  -0.5047 0.5952     
28  1.2333  0.3079  -0.2402 0.6059     
29  0.9915  0.3303  -0.3040 0.6235     
Local un-          
 employment  4.2967  1.8112  -5.8270 2.6805     
          
Immigrant   -0.3048 0.2750 0.1555 0.6433        
          
Age          
20       3.0887 0.0862    
21  2.9821 0.6088     2.6062 0.0805 1.9244 0.2070
22 1.4379  0.7639  -0.8281 1.5471 1.4970 0.0831 1.5170 0.1720
23 0.4314  0.5873  -0.7852 1.3354 0.9022 0.0843 0.7501 0.1572
24  -0.2071 0.6766 2.0289 2.3219 0.6915 0.0807 0.0605 0.1463
25 0.7185  0.3570  -0.3242 1.2400 0.5214 0.0784 -0.1486  0.1376
26 0.4182  0.3560  -0.0525 0.8392 0.4017 0.0774 -0.0946  0.1297
27 0.1155  0.3440  -0.3871 0.8003 0.3260 0.0747 -0.0777  0.1263
28 0.1187  0.3003  -0.6589 0.6896 0.2026 0.0747 -0.0365  0.1200 49   
29 -0.4306  0.3362  -0.5594 0.6141 0.0581 0.0752 0.0731 0.1177
30 Ref. Ref. Ref. Ref.   
31 -0.1833  0.2664  -1.0066 0.5371 -0.1388 0.0761 -0.0299  0.1180
32  0.1829 0.2451 0.0905 0.4941 -0.0879 0.0727 -0.1769  0.1200
33 -0.0728  0.2423  -0.1909 0.4917 -0.1308 0.0746 0.0304 0.1186
34 -0.1291  0.2422  -0.3940 0.5098 -0.1086 0.0740 -0.0812  0.1203
35 0.0514  0.2354  -0.3018 0.5054 -0.1494 0.0742 -0.1587  0.1198
36 0.0310  0.2325  -0.3784 0.4902 -0.2190 0.0748 -0.1998  0.1212
37 -0.2008  0.2395  -0.2712 0.4834 -0.1693 0.0739 -0.1848  0.1174
38 -0.0824  0.2289  -0.3862 0.4889 -0.2175 0.0747 -0.3216  0.1202
39 -0.0435  0.2352  -0.3841 0.4920 -0.3917 0.0771 -0.2508  0.1172
40 -0.0887  0.2355  -0.4465 0.4840 -0.2657 0.0760 -0.2150  0.1179
41 -0.0946  0.2334  -0.5688 0.4958 -0.2486 0.0765 -0.3355  0.1207
42 -0.1450  0.2403  -0.4102 0.4857 -0.2606 0.0772 -0.2267  0.1206
43 -0.0219  0.2361  -0.7519 0.5034 -0.2360 0.0768 -0.2457  0.1223
44 0.1092  0.2391  -0.5840 0.4895 -0.2671 0.0787 -0.2056  0.1204
45 0.0637  0.2418  -0.8931 0.4913 -0.2430 0.0805 -0.3268  0.1222
46 0.0402  0.2451  -0.7148 0.4917 -0.2687 0.0808 -0.2388  0.1221
47 0.2032  0.2486  -1.0720 0.4970 -0.3260 0.0833 -0.2925  0.1247
48 0.1982  0.2554  -0.9149 0.4933 -0.2827 0.0838 -0.4282  0.1284
49 0.3136  0.2558  -0.9508 0.5010 -0.2519 0.0865 -0.4116  0.1295
50 0.3354  0.2621  -1.1372 0.5063 -0.2226 0.0875 -0.4281  0.1332
51 0.5292  0.2630  -1.0786 0.5060 -0.1619 0.0904 -0.5445  0.1348
52 0.4666  0.2699  -1.3244 0.5163 -0.2218 0.0948 -0.6077  0.1382
53 0.3586  0.2801  -1.7056 0.5323 -0.0713 0.0956 -0.8280  0.1447
54 0.7166  0.2824  -1.2535 0.5224 -0.0135 0.1003 -0.7338  0.1472
55 0.5921  0.3003  -1.4600 0.5284 0.0649 0.1037 -0.8746  0.1518
56 0.4145  0.3227  -1.6104 0.5489 0.0686 0.1101 -0.8352  0.1557
57 0.8699  0.3241  -1.7515 0.5610 0.0786 0.1167 -0.9614  0.1637
58 0.8246  0.3556  -2.3849 0.6215 0.4129 0.1166 -1.1760  0.1762
59 1.0486  0.3678  -2.0731 0.6212 0.6108 0.1234 -1.4564  0.1920
60 1.3557  0.3753  -2.5427 0.7073 0.7371 0.1298 -1.1586  0.1827
61 1.1863  0.4549  -2.4680 0.7599 1.2162 0.1297 -1.4695  0.2151
62 1.0719  0.5651  -1.5980 0.6997 1.2597 0.1516 -1.3786  0.2258
63 2.9373  0.5026  -2.0957 0.9410 2.5622 0.1386 -1.6894  0.2838
64 2.5545  0.7803  -2.4052 1.1696 2.5220 0.1813 -2.2460  0.3641
Educational          
attainment          
<=9  Ref.  Ref.    Ref.    Ref   
10-11  0.0446 0.0881 0.4670 0.1056 -0.2716 0.0281 0.3099 0.0369
12  -0.3572 0.1158 0.5648 0.1419 -0.7731 0.0406 0.4696 0.0609
13-15  -0.2323 0.1219 0.5320 0.1656 -0.4201 0.0455 0.3239 0.0653
16+  -0.1539 0.1026 0.6538 0.1287 -0.7748 0.0411 0.4704 0.0629
Missing  0.3550 0.0943 0.1354 0.1124 0.3522 0.1541 0.0165 0.1900
Duration          
dependence          
1  year  0.5873 0.0764 1.0936 0.0848 1.3323 0.0296 0.8685 0.0388
2  years  0.4426 0.0929 0.5989 0.0918 0.9443 0.0357 0.4227 0.0377
3  years  Ref.  Ref.    Ref.    Ref   
    
 
 